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THE COLLAPSE AND FALL OF FLOATING BUFFER
ZONES: THE COURT CLARIFIES ANALYSIS FOR RE-
VIEWING SPEECH-RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTIONS IN
SCHENCK V. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK
I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom of speech, although a predominant First Amend-
ment principle, does not create an absolute right and remains
subject to limitations for appropriate reasons, such as when the
exercise of free speech encroaches upon the rights of others.'
Particularly sensitive situations arise when courts impose re-
strictions upon anti-abortion protestors in an attempt to protect
the rights of patients and providers at abortion clinics. Indeed,
despite a woman's long established right to obtain an abortion,2
emotionally charged demonstrations and recurrent anti-choice
violence persist outside abortion clinics around the nation.3
Given that such practices induce stress and other health risks
to women seeking an abortion,4 courts have issued injunctions
which place restrictions, such as buffer zones, on anti-choice
activity.5 Most recently, in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,6 the
Supreme Court clarified the constitutionality of such restrictions
and upheld a "fixed" fifteen-foot buffer zone and cease-and-de-
sist order, but struck down a "floating" fifteen-foot buffer zone
1. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976).
2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. See David E. Rovella, Abortion Clinic Act Gutted by Unexpected Ruling, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at A6 (reporting National Abortion Federation statistics of a 21%
drop in violence at abortion clinics nationwide in 1996, but a 137% increase in 'hate
mail" and harassing calls, and a 189% jump in picketing).
4. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1427 (W.D.N.Y.
1992).
5. See Tara K. Kelly, Note, Silencing the Lambs: Restricting the First Amend-
ment Rights of Abortion Clinic Protestors in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,
68 S. CAL L. REV. 427, 421-32 (1995).
6. 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
7. See id. at 859.
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' The Court assumed a strong posture in Schenck in order to
provide clear guidance to future courts in drafting and review-
ing content-neutral injunctions. But the Court garnered its
strength by supplanting the district court's reasoning with more
appropriate justifications for its holdings, and by identifying
and striking down a floating bubble concept not clearly ad-
dressed by the trial court. While the Court's blatant inteijection
of new reasoning draws curious attention, its analysis is never-
theless legally sound and provides a practical roadmap to guide
courts in assessing content-neutral injunctions.
Part II of this casenote summarizes the backdrop of tradition-
al and changing legal concepts against which Schenck originat-
ed and developed. Part III provides a detailed exposition of
Schenck, including the separate opinions of the Justices. Part
IV analyzes the legitimacy of the Court's reasoning, with an
assessment of the decision's practical implications, and a projec-
tion of how Schenck's principles will guide future courts in
drafting and reviewing injunctions. Finally, Part V concludes
that despite the Court's creative review of the lower court's
holdings, the Court's decision provides important guidance for
courts in issuing and reviewing injunctions.
II. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."' Although the
literal language places no conditions on this freedom, the Su-
preme Court has nevertheless upheld laws which impose re-
strictions on speech. Indeed, the Court considers some forms of
expression, which may harm others or debase community moral
standards, as entirely outside the scope of First Amendment
protections. The distribution and use of obscenity, for example,
may be regulated by the government in a public forum with
very deferential, minimal review by the courts.9 Also, fighting
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
9. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Paris Adult Theatre v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Expressive materials are not considered legally obscene
unless they fit the definition posited by the Miller test, which differentiates between
unprotected obscenity and protected materials which are simply sexually explicit. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1973).
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words," defamation," and false or misleading commercial
speech' receive little, if any, constitutional protection.
But beyond these extreme forms of speech, the Supreme
Court has also recognized that the government generally has a
limited right to regulate the freedom of expression when there
are important policies served by the regulation. Indeed, the
right of women to seek abortions has repeatedly clashed with
the free speech rights of abortion protestors outside abortion
clinics. This section traces the factual and legal developments
that occurred prior to and during the Schenck controversy.
A. The Abortion Controversy
Since the legalization of abortion in 1973,'3 various anti-
abortion groups have resorted to disturbances, acts of violence,
and volatile demonstrations to stop abortion clinics from provid-
ing medical and counseling services to women. The most recent
reports show that violence has abated somewhat in the last
couple of years, with 30% of clinics reporting anti-abortion vio-
lence in 1996, compared with 39% in 1995, and 52% in 1994.'
10. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). Before speech may be categorized as fighting words,
however, the speech must pose a "clear and present danger" as defined in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which refers to speech "directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce such action."
Id. at 447.
11. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Before a public
official may recover damages from defamation relating to his official conduct, he must
"prove that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not...." Id.
at 279-80. The Supreme Court has also determined that other factors come into play,
such as whether the statement is a matter of private or public concern, and whether
the plaintiff is a private or public figure. See generally Dunn v. Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974).
12. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). On the other hand, commercial speech is protected if it meets the four-
pronged test established by Central Hudson: (1) the commercial speech must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading;, (2) the asserted government interest must be
substantial; (3) the regulation must directly advance the governmental interest as-
serted; and (4) the regulation may not be more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest See iL at 566.
13. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14. See Angie Cannon, Violence Has Decreased, But the Threat Continues, THE
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But considerable violence nevertheless persists, including death
threats, stalkings, bombings, arson, and blockades. 5 Moreover,
if the term "violence" were expanded to include other activities,
such as gunfire, home picketing, and vandalism, the rate in
1996 has actually increased to 46%."6
Although acts of violence surely inhibit or prevent many
women from receiving medical or counseling assistance, even
the more peaceful exercises by demonstrators such as "sidewalk
counseling"'7 and blockades can cause severe stress in women
seeking an abortion." Such activities may not be intended as
threatening in nature, but it has been shown that because of
the highly emotional nature of the abortion issue, and the pri-
vacy concerns of the patients, emotions can erupt into harassing
and intimidating situations."9 In fact, a woman can even suffer
increased medical risks with her abortion as a result of the
stress and anxiety, including elevated blood pressure and hyper-
ventilation.' Such conditions can subsequently cause patients
to cancel their appointments or try to reschedule, which may
not always be possible.2' Thus, even semi-peaceful activities
associated with anti-abortion protestors' free speech rights have
posed a difficult problem for the legislature and the courts.
REC. N. NEW JERSEY, Jan. 17, 1997, at A14 (citing the 1997 annual report on clinic
violence from the National Abortion Federation).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. "Sidewalk counseling" occurs when demonstrators offer reading materials to
women entering abortion clinics and attempt to convince them not to undergo an
abortion. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1424
(W.D.N.Y. 1992).
18. See id. at 1427.
19. See id. at 1425.
20. See id. at 1427.
21. See id. Also, there are some abortion procedures that take place over multiple
appointments, such as the insertion of laminaria to dilate the cervix overnight, and
there is a risk of complication if a woman cannot attend her follow-up appointment.
See id.; see also Arianne IK Tepper, Note, In Your F.AC.E.: Federal Enforcement of
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, 17 PACE L. REV. 489, 517
(1997).
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B. Common Law and Legislative Developments
Prior to 1994, women seeking legal protections from anti-
abortion speech and speech-related conduct were severely limit-
ed. Some women applied for an injunction under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3),22 which provides a federal cause of action to those
deprived of their constitutional rights against persons conspir-
ing to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws.'
But the most recent abortion-related case tried under this law,
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,' held that abor-
tion-rights organizations could not effectively apply for an in-
junction under this statute.' The majority stated that for a
private conspiracy to violate this section, a plaintiff must prove
two elements: (1) a "class-based, invidiously discriminatory ani-
mus;"2 and (2) a showing of clear violation of protected
rights.27 The Court held that the abortion clinics did not meet
the first requirement because women wishing to terminate a
pregnancy are not considered within the class the legislation
intended to protect.' Also, the second element was not met
because the two rights cited by the abortion clinics-right to
interstate travel and right to an abortion-were only incidental-
ly affected.' Thus, by refusing abortion-rights organizations
any injunctive relief under section 1985(3), the Court shifted
the problem to the legislative branch."
In reaction to Bray and the increasing abortion-related vio-
lence around the country, Congress enacted the Freedom of
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994).
23. Id. This Act is also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act or the Ku Klux Act of
1871 because it was enacted in response to "massive, organized lawlessness that
infected our Southern States during the post-Civil War era." Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 307 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
25. See id.
26. I& at 268-69.
27. See id. at 274.
28. See id. at 269-70.
29. See id. at 274-75.
30. See Helen I. Franco, Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994: The
Face of Things to Come?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1083, 1096 (1995).
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Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE)3' to prohibit
the use of force, threat of force, or physical obstruction to in-
jure, intimidate, or interfere with the provision of reproductive
health care services.3 2 This new law is significant because pre-
viously, Congress had adopted a conservative stance regarding
abortion rights, acting mainly to place limits on abortion
funding."m The FACE Act, however, specifically recognizes and
outlaws violence and the threat of violence at abortion clinic
entrances, which demonstrates Congress's intent that a woman
should be free from physical intimidation when asserting her
right to end a pregnancy.' Importantly, this Act allows in-
junctive relief as a civil penalty," a vitally essential mecha-
nism for abortion-rights organizations, since court-issued injunc-
tions are usually the most effective means to restrict anti-abor-
tion activity.36
C. Distinction Between Content-Neutral and Content-Based
Regulations
In controversies where abortion protestors seek to challenge
the constitutionality of speech-restricting regulation, the Su-
preme Court has developed a complex analysis that includes
several factors. For example, the Court adjusts the level of
scrutiny to be applied to the regulation depending on whether
the restrictions on speech are content-neutral or content-based.
The fundamental distinction between content-based and con-
tent-neutral regulation of speech turns on whether the re-
31. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). One of the more extreme acts included throwing plas-
tic likenesses of fetuses at the women approaching the clinic. See Tepper, supra note
21, at 490 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1992)).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 248.
33. See Franco, supra note 30, at 1097. Indeed, the word "abortion" is stated only
a single time in the statute, in an apparent compromise between the two houses of
Congress. See id. at 1108.
34. See id. at 1097.
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(cX1)(B).
36. See Joanne Neilson, Note, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.: Protection-
ism Against Antiabortionist Terrorism, 16 PACE L. REV. 325, 339 (1996). Besides pro-
viding a basis for injunctions, the final version of the statute differentiates between
nonviolent and violent activities by establishing a hierarchy of criminal fines and
prison terms, and specifically exempts routine picketing from punishment. See Franco,
supra note 30.
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striction is based on the subject of the speech, or simply on the
speech itself. A pertinent inquiry asks: is the government's pur-
pose for the law grounded in objection with the message the
speech conveys?"7 If so, the law is content-based.
Because a content-based regulation is predicated upon the
subject matter of the speech, it receives strict scrutiny by the
Court and will be upheld only if the state can show that the
restriction is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 8 The govern-
ment has the burden of proving that the law is necessary, and
courts will always consider whether less-burdensome means for
accomplishing the governmental objective are available. 9 Such
regulations are almost always struck down, because it is pre-
sumptively unconstitutional for the government to place bur-
dens on speech because of its content.'
On the other hand, content-neutral regulations are crafted
without reference to the message the expression conveys,4 and
usually apply to cases like Schenck where the injunction or
ordinance restricts the activities of the speakers, not the subject
matter. Such regulations are often termed "time, place, and
manner" restrictions because the government in effect regulates
the speech-related conduct, as opposed to the content speech.4"
The Court has traditionally upheld content-neutral time, place,
and manner regulations if they meet an intermediate level of
scrutiny. Indeed, in 1990 when the Schenck case originated, a
content-neutral restriction in a public forum s was upheld if it
37. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NMMR ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §
3:3 (1997).
38. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 115-118 (1991).
39. See id&
40. See SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 3:1 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641
(1984)).
41. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
42. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
43. A public forum is generally considered to be the streets, sidewalks, and parks
because they "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. Committee for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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was "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental in-
terest, and... [left] open ample alternative channels for com-
munication of the information."'
Summarizing the two tests then, the government's interest in
content-neutral regulations need only be significant (or impor-
tant), whereas the government interest in content-based regula-
tions must be compelling (or overriding). And, while both con-
tent-neutral and content-based regulations must be narrowly
tailored to fit the problem area, the content-based regulation
will usually be struck down if there are any other less burden-
some methods by which the government can accomplish its
objective. Because most regulations governing abortion
protestors' activities attempt only to restrict the time, place,
and manner of speech-related conduct, and not the actual mes-
sage the protestors convey, the regulations are typically con-
tent-neutral and receive the intermediate level of scrutiny.
D. Distinction Between Injunctions and Ordinances
Another wrinkle in the Court's analysis recently developed,
however, specifically concerning content-neutral injunctions. In
1994, the Supreme Court differentiated between the proper
analysis to utilize in content-neutral ordinances and content-
neutral injunctions in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc."
In that case, operators of abortion clinics sought to broaden an
already standing content-neutral injunction against anti-abor-
tion protestors, complaining that protestors persisted in imped-
ing access to the clinic, and that their activities caused damag-
ing effects.'
The Madsen Court altered its traditional test for content-
neutral regulation (the regulation is upheld if it is "narrowly
44. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. Note that a slight variation to the intermediate test
applies if the content-neutral speech occurs in a non-public forum: the government
restriction will be upheld only if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government
purpose. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983).
45. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
46. See id. at 757-59.
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drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech")47 and
posited a new test especially designed for content-neutral in-
junctions: the injunction would be upheld if its challenged pro-
vision. "burden[ed] no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant government interest.' 4 Thus, the Court retained
the "ends" portion of the analysis by requiring a significant (or
important) government interest, but it strengthened the
"means" segment of the test by heightening the standard from
"narrowly tailored" to "burden no more speech than necessary,"
the latter of which is more indicative of strict scrutiny. This
analysis currently stands midway between the strict scrutiny
test for content-based regulation of speech, and the intermedi-
ate time, place, and manner test normally utilized for content-
neutral injunctions.49
It also appears that the Madsen majority reached a compro-
mise between Justice Stevens, who endorsed a less rigorous
standard for injunctions, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, who advocated strict scrutiny. ° Indeed, in their argu-
ment for strict scrutiny, the three dissenting Justices claimed
that the majority opinion clouded the traditional notion that a
state-issued injunction is a prior restraint, which usually re-
ceives strict scrutiny."'
47. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
48. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
49. See SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 15:53. Ironically, it might be noted that the
new test bears a resemblance to the "undue burden" test established in the abortion
case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In that case, the Court
held that a state may regulate abortion if the regulation does not pose an undue
burden. See /d; see also Jennifer J. Seibring, If It's Not Too Much to Ask, Could You
Please Shut Up?, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 205, 218 (1995).
50. See Deborah A. Ellis & Yolanda S. Wu, Of Buffer Zones and Broken Bones:
Balancing Access to Abortion and Anti-Abortion Protestors' First Amendment Rights in
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network 62 BROOK. L. REV. 547, 558 n.62 (1996).
51. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 797-98. The term "prior restraint" refers to court
orders which proscribe speech even before it occurs, as opposed to subsequent pun-
ishment after the speech takes place. See SmOLLA, supra note 37, § 15:1. Prior re-
straints have been understood to include mechanisms such as gag orders and court-is-
sued injunctions and, when challenged, the Court typically applies heightened scrutiny
because prior restraints are considered more serious infringements on constitutional
freedoms. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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In a footnote to the opinion, however, the Court asserted that
all injunctions are not prior restraints, although prior restraints
can and often do take the form of injunctions.12 The Court ex-
plained that the injunction in this case was not a prior re-
straint because the protestors were not prevented from express-
ing their message through alternative methods; they were only
prohibited from conveying their message within a thirty-six-foot
buffer zone.5" Moreover, the injunction was issued because of
their prior unlawful conduct.' 4
In further justifying the different analyses for ordinances and
injunctions, the Madsen Court noted that ordinances and in-
junctions are developed for very different reasons to govern
distinct types of situations. On the one hand, "[o]rdinances
represent a legislative choice regarding the promotion of partic-
ular societal interests. Injunctions, by contrast, are remedies
imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative
or judicial decree."5 Therefore, "[i]njunctions . . . carry greater
risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do gen-
eral ordinances."" Also, the Court justified more stringent
scrutiny of injunctions because injunctions are more tailored by
the court than general statutes, to afford more specific relief
where the law has already been violated. 7
With its new analysis in place, the Court in Madsen upheld a
thirty-six-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and drive-
way, finding that the zone burdened no more speech than nec-
essary to achieve the governmental interests of protecting
access to the clinic and orderly traffic flow in the street." The
Court also found constitutional certain restrictions on noise, as
the limitations burdened no more speech than necessary to
ensure the health and well-being of the patients.59 The Court
52. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 n.2.
53. See id.
54. See id. This proclamation, however, received adamant opposition from Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. See id. at 797-98.
55. Id. at 764.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 765 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)).
58. See id. at 768-70.
59. See id. at 772.
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noted that "noise control is particularly important around hospi-
tals and medical facilities during surgery and recovery
periods.' °
The Court, however, struck down a thirty-six-foot buffer zone
around private property surrounding the clinic, noting that the
zone burdened more speech than necessary since patients and
staff wishing to reach the clinic were not forced to cross that
particular property.6' The Court also struck down a 300-foot
zone around the staff residences, explaining that the zone cov-
ered more broadly than necessary to protect the tranquility and
privacy of the home since "a limitation on the time duration of
picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could
have accomplished the desired result. 2 Another mechanism
deemed unconstitutional was the blanket ban on "images ob-
servable" around the clinic.' The Court reasoned that the ban
extended more broadly than necessary to attain the goals of
reducing verbal threats to clinic patients or their families, as
well as alleviating the patients' anxiety levels once they were
inside the clinic." The Court explained that alternative means
were available. Prohibiting the display of signs that could be in-
terpreted as threats or veiled threats, for example, would satis-
fy the first goal, while a clinic could simply pull its curtains to
protect a patient bothered by a disagreeable placard.'
Thus, the Court in Madsen not only clarified the proper test
regarding content-neutral injunctions; it also demonstrated that
within the abortion controversy, mechanisms such as reasonable
buffer zones and noise restrictions, which support FACE's dis-
couragement of physical intimidation and obstruction to clinic
access, are likely to be upheld under the First Amendment."
60. Id.
61. See id. at 771, 774-75.
62. Id. at 775.
63. See id. at 773.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See SMOLLA, supra note 37, § 15:53. But note that Madsen is not applicable
to violations of FACE, since FACE is a statute. The Court differentiated between an
injunction and a statute in determining which level of scrutiny should apply. See
Franco, supra note 30, at 1118. Indeed, Madsen applies to injunctions banning all
protest conduct within a limited buffer zone, while FACE more narrowly forbids phys-
ical obstruction of clinic entranceways. See id. n.245 (citing 140 CONG. REC. S5596
(daffy ed. May 12, 1994)).
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But attempts to shield women from the realistic and possibly
painful message which anti-abortion demonstrators convey will
generally be considered an infringement upon free speech rights
of the protestors. 7
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual and Procedural History
Against the backdrop of the Court's evolving analysis regard-
ing content-neutral regulation, coupled with the revived atten-
tion by Congress to the abortion controversy, the Schenck case
emerged. The following subsections trace the case's birth and
development over the last seven years as the courts struggled
with unresolved issues within a volatile political environment.
This section culminates with the Supreme Court's final decision
and governing rules in this area.
1. Temporary Restraining Order
The Schenck case originated in September 1990 when Pro-
Choice of Western New York, an organization promoting safe
and legal access to family planning and abortion services, joined
various clinics and doctors in suing several anti-choice organiza-
tions and individuals in order to enjoin a planned 'blockade" of
an abortion clinic." This clinic, along with other reproductive
health care centers, had been the target of massive demonstra-
tions and heated confrontations by abortion protestors.' The
Western District Court of New York issued a temporary re-
straining order (TRO) on September 27, 1990, with three rel-
evant provisions to this case.7" First, there was a general pro-
hibition from "trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or
obstructing access to" any abortion clinic in the district.1 Sec-
67. See Franco, supra note 30, at 1118.
68. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, Civ. 90 No. 1004A (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
69. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1424-27
(W.D.N.Y. 1992).
70. See Pro-Choice Network, Civ. 90 No. 1004A.
71. Id. at 1(a)
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ond, the order established a buffer zone which banned demonstra-
tions "within fifteen feet from any person seeking access to or
leaving [clinics]. 7 2 Finally, the TRO exempted "sidewalk coun-
seling, a conversation of a nonthreatening nature by not more
than two people," 3 from the prohibitions, provided that once
the audience denoted her wish not to be counseled, "the protes-
tors must cease and desist from such counseling." 4 Although
the defendants abstained from their planned blockade, the dem-
onstrations continued, including harassing and intimidating
behavior. 5
2. Preliminary Injunction
On February 14, 1992, the district court granted the
plaintiffs' motion to convert the TRO into a preliminary injunc-
tion."6 The court followed the controlling test for content-neu-
tral injunctions that was in place at that time (prior to
Madsen)" and determined that the injunction was indeed nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and
left open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information. 8 The court identified three significant government
interests: safe abortions, public safety, and "ensuring 'that the
constitutional rights of one group are not sacrificed in the inter-
est of the constitutional rights of another.'7 9 The court further
72. Id. at 1(b).
73. Id- at 1(c).
74. I&
75. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1423-27
(W.D.N.Y. 1992).
76. See id. at 1423. In seeking a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs claimed
conspiracy to infringe on the constitutional rights of women seeking abortion under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1984), as well as six additional state law claims. See id.
77. See Section H.C., discussed supra.
78. See Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1433, 1437. The court also followed
the guidance steps established by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit for granting preliminary injunctions: the health care providers established
irreparable harm from patients' delayed access to clinics, as well as a likelihood of
success on the merits of the federal claim so as to be entitled to a preliminary in-
junction. See id. at 1428-29.
79. Id. at 1433 (citations omitted).
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reasoned that the injunction was narrowly tailored because
specific provisions of the injunction met the needs established
by the evidence." Specifically, the court justified the cease-
and-desist provision by determining that a woman entering the
clinic was a "captive audience" for the protestors' message, and
that the defendants' own activities precluded any practical
means of escape."' The district court, therefore, premised its
holding concerning this provision on the principle that a woman
has the right to be left alone. 2 Finally, the court determined
that the injunction still left open ample alternative channels for
communication of defendants' message, such as assembly out-
side the clear zones, picketing, and the use of sidewalk counsel-
ors." The resulting injunction mirrored most of the relevant
provisions of the TRO with a few exceptions. One change ex-
panded the fifteen-foot buffer zone around persons seeking
access to or leaving clinics to include vehicles.' Also, the in-
junction added a fifteen-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances
or driveways.'
3. District Court Denies Motion to Vacate
In 1993, the defendants moved the district court to dismiss
the plaintiffs' complaint regarding the federal cause of action
(conspiracy to deprive a woman of interstate travel to seek an
abortion) 6 in light of the Supreme Court's recent holding in
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.87 The defendants
argued that the invalidity of this claim denied the court juris-
diction over the pendent state law claims.88 But the district
80. See id.
81. See id. at 1435-37. The captive audience doctrine states that when someone
cannot, as a practical matter, escape from unwarranted intrusion, the speaker's ex-
pressive activity can be restricted. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1988).
Previously, the Court had not included the defendants own conduct as an additional
factor in applying the captive audience doctrine. See Ellis & Wu, supra note 50, at
581.
82. See Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1435.
83. See id. at 1487.
84. See id. at 1440.
85. See id.
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994).
87. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 828 F. Supp. 1018 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
88. See id. at 1020.
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court denied the motion, maintaining jurisdiction over the pen-
dent law claims and allowing the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint. 9 Thus, the plaintiffs were permitted to continue
their action under two state law claims, New York Civil Rights
Law § 40-c90 and New York State trespass law.9'
4. Review by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit
Defendants appealed the injunction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1994,' subsequent
to the Supreme Court's decision in Madsen. The court of ap-
peals found that the interests identified by the district court
still qualified as significant governmental interests," but in
applying the new Madsen test of whether the restrictions "bur-
dened no more speech than necessary," the court found two
provisions of the injunction unconstitutional: the fifteen-foot
buffer zone and the cease-and-desist order.' The court held
that prohibiting obstruction of access adequately served the
needs established by the record without an additional surround-
ing buffer zone.95 The court also determined that the cease-
and-desist provision burdened more speech than necessary be-
cause "in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting,
and even outrageous, speech in order to provide 'adequate
"breathing space" to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment."' Judge Oakes dissented.9'
89. See id. at 1032.
90. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2) (Consol. 1982 & Supp. 1997).
91. See Pro-Choice Network, at 1018.
92. See Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994).
93. See id. at 369.
94. See id. at 369-72.
95. See id. at 370-71.
96. Id. at 372 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
97. Judge Oakes claimed that both the 15-foot buffer zone and cease-and-desist
provision were necessary to ensure the health and safety of the patients receiving
abortions at the clinics. Id. at 374 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
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5. En Banc Review
In September of 1995, the court of appeals granted an en
banc hearing to reconsider the constitutionality of the two
stricken provisions." This time, however, the court more care-
fully scrutinized the injunction's provisions and determined that
the injunction's language contained both a fifteen-foot floating
zone (moving with people and vehicles) and fifteen-foot fixed
zone (surrounding the doors and access ways)." Comparing the
Schenck and Madsen records, the plurality determined that
both types of zones were constitutionally permissible."° The
Madsen Court had upheld a thirty-six-foot fixed buffer zone,10'
which the Schenck court considered more restrictive in distance,
but less restrictive in type because it did not "float."'° Thus,
the court of appeals reasoned, the cases were sufficiently simi-
lar overall to uphold the two types of smaller zones in
Schenck."° Another factor the court considered in upholding
the zones included the emotionally charged and disruptive dem-
onstration, justifying the need for such protected areas.'" Al-
though one point of contention was whether the defendants' few
violations of the original TRO constituted a failure of the TRO,
the en banc court reasoned that the ineffectiveness of a TRO
was only one of several factors considered in imposing a
broader injunction. 5 Also, the court deferred to the district
court's judgment that the length of the fifteen-foot buffer zone
was a reasonable distance.06
98. See Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377 (1995).
99. See id. at 387-90.
100. See id.
101. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1994).
102. See Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 388.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 389.
105. See id. at 386-88.
106. See id. at 390. The court relied on Madsen's statement that, 'some deference
must be given to the [trial] court's familiarity with the facts and the background of
the dispute between the parties even under our heightened review' Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-70).
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Finally, the court upheld the cease-and-desist provision by
contrasting the clause with a provision which was struck down
in Madsen.!07 The Madsen injunction prohibited demonstrators
from approaching any person within 300 feet of the clinic "un-
less such person indicate[d] a desire to communicate."" s The
court considered Schenck's comparatively proactive provision,
with its sidewalk counselor exemption, as more mindful of the
demonstrators' interest.'" Also, the court determined that
women confronted with sidewalk counselors were essentially a
captive audience, further justifying the need for the cease-and
desist-provision if the women wished to curtail the sidewalk
counselor's message.1
The divided en banc court issued several separate opinions,
including strong dissents by Judges Meskill and Altimari."
Since the theories behind these separate opinions seem to have
affected the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in this case, a
short summary is provided here. Judge Winter concurred in the
result, but argued that the decision should have been grounded
in the broader government interests of protecting individuals
from coercive or obstructionist conduct, especially where tar-
geted listeners are concerned." In a separate concurring opin-
ion, Judge Jacobs agreed with Judge Winters and added that
the court should have also relied upon the government interests
identified in Madsen: public safety, free flow of traffic, and
property rights of citizens."'
Judge Meskill adamantly dissented, arguing that the Schenck
and Madsen records were sufficiently dissimilar such that the
buffer zone and cease-and-desist provisions failed the Madsen
test." Contrasting Schenck's more routine demonstrations
and general compliance with the TRO with Madsen's massive
crowds and occasions of violence, Judge Meskill argued that the
Schenck record did not support the injunction's provisions."
107. See id. at 390-91.
108. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773.
109. See Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 390-91.
110. See id. at 392.
111. See id. at 399-411.
112. See id. at 394-98 (Winter, J., concurring).
113. See id. at 398-99 (Jacobs, J., concurring).
114. See id. at 399-409 (Meskdll, J., dissenting).
115. See id.
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Judge Meskill also considered the cease-and-desist provision
unconstitutional because "[w]hile counselors may cause distress
to those attempting to enter the clinics, such offense is an inev-
itable cost of free expression under the First Amendment.""6
Judge Altimari penned a separate dissent, agreeing with
Judge Meskill that since the TRO was generally obeyed, the
injunction was not justified."7 Judge Altimari also criticized
the court's assessment of the cease-and-desist provision within
the context of the captive audience doctrine, asserting that the
provision should be upheld instead because public streets are
traditional fora for exercising First Amendment rights."8
B. United States Supreme Court Majority Opinion
On February 19, 1997, the United States Supreme Court
handed down the final decision in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Net-
work." 9 The Court began its analysis by summarizing the cur-
rently operative test from Madsen for content-neutral injunc-
tions: "whether the challenged provisions of the injunction bur-
den no more speech than necessary to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest."2 ' The Court then applied Madsen to the
challenged provisions of the Schenck injunction: the floating
fifteen-foot buffer zones around people and vehicles seeking
access to the clinics, the fixed fifteen-foot buffer zones around
the clinic driveways and parking lot entrances, and the cease-
and-desist provision that forced sidewalk counselors who are
inside the buffer zones to retreat fifteen feet from the person
being counseled once the person indicated a desire not to be
counseled.'"
116. Id.
117. See id. at 409-11 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
118. See id.
119. 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
120. Id. at 864 (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765
(1994)).
121. See id.
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1. Governmental Interests
The Court recognized four significant governmental interests:
(1) ensuring public safety and order; (2) promoting free flow of
traffic; (3) protecting property rights; and (4) protecting
women s freedom to seek pregnancy-related services.' The
first interest of public safety was identified by the district court
in evaluating the injunction, and was also recognized in
Madsen, but never stated in the plaintiffs complaint in
Schenck.' The Court nevertheless justified this interest by
explaining that in assessing a First Amendment challenge, a
court should examine not only the private claims named in the
complaint, but also probe into possible governmental interests
advanced by the injunction.' The Court also extracted the
other interests from Madsen, noting that the interests identified
in Madsen permissibly extended to Schenck, given the similar
factual records of the two cases, and that collectively, the inter-
ests were important enough to "justify an appropriately tailored
injunction to secure unimpeded physical access to the
clinics. " '2u
122. See id. at 866. Petitioners had argued that no significant governmental inter-
ests remained to support the injunction because only one of the seven causes of ac-
tion in the plaintiffs' original complaint remained-trespass-and a trespass could jus-
tify only an injunction that prohibited trespass. See id. at 865. But the Court rejected
this argument, explaining that the elements of the original § 1985(3) complaint also
complied with a § 40-c claim under state law. And even though Bray forced the §
1985(3) claim to be dismissed, the state law claims survived. See id.
123. See id. at 866. Note that the plaintiffs in Madsen also did not identify a
public safety interest in their complaint. The Schenck majority acknowledged that this
was understandable since a plaintiff "customarily alleges violations of private rights,
while 'public safety' expresses a public right enforced by the government through its
criminal laws and otherwise." Id.
124. See id. The Court also noted that the district court had recognized public
safety as a valid interest. In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the district
courts identification of this interest was inappropriate because only the government
may seek an injunction with this interest. See id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
But the majority said that the district court's reliance on this interest was not to
buttress support for the injunction, but to utilize it as a justification for rejecting
petitioner's challenge to the injunction. See id. at 866 n.7.
125. Id. at 866.
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2. Floating Buffer Zone
With these interests established, the Court then struck down
the fifteen-foot floating buffer zones around people and vehicles
because they "burden[ed] more speech than is necessary to
serve the relevant government interests."" First, the Court
explained that the floating zone was inappropriate because of
the type of speech prohibited. Demonstrators would be prevent-
ed from distributing informational literature or talking to the
women from a normal conversational distance, which countered
traditional forms of expression: 'l[1eafletting and commenting on
matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at
the heart of the First Amendment .. . .127
Second, the nature of the location was an important issue in
striking down the floating zone. Because such a zone would
tread far beyond the clinic and with the moving individual or
vehicle as it traveled, the Court reasoned, the traditional fora
for public speech-the sidewalks and streets-would be unnec-
essarily affected." Also, the Court considered the floating
concept difficult to enforce since the sidewalk was only seven-
teen feet, and it would be logistically awkward for both a pro-
testor and his audience to communicate on the sidewalk.12
The uncertainty involved in enforcing the injunction, the Court
explained, would pose a "substantial risk that much more
speech will be burdened than the injunction by its terms pro-
hibits."' 0 The Court concluded its comments on the floating
buffer zones by noting that, with respect to vehicles, a narrower
injunction to keep protestors away from driveways and parking
lot entrances, such as the fixed buffer zone, was adequate to
enable drivers to enter and exit the clinic parking lots safely
and easily.'3 '
126. Id. at 866-67.
127. Id. at 867 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
128. See id. at 866-67.
129. See id
130. Id. at 867.
131. See id. at 868.
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3. Fixed Buffer Zone
Accordingly, the Court then upheld the fifteen-foot fixed buff-
er zones around the doorways, driveways, and drivelvay en-
trances as necessary to ensure that individuals and automobiles
were able to access the clinic."3 2 Noting the similarities be-
tween the Schenck and Madsen records of repeated blockages of
entrances and hindering individuals accessing the clinic, the
Court concluded that the district court correctly banned demon-
strators from the entranceways. 3" The Court also deferred to
the district court's judgment that fifteen feet was an appropri-
ate distance."8 Finally, in a significant footnote to this section
of the opinion, the Court noted that since the injunction al-
lowed two sidewalk counselors into the fixed buffer zones, the
district court had "ben[t] over backwards to 'accommodate'
defendants' free speech rights" with respect to establishing a
proper fixed buffer zone."
In upholding the fixed buffer zone, the Court rejected several
of petitioners' arguments. First, petitioners contended that other
existing injunction provisions, such as restrictions on trespass-
ing noise and blocking access, were sufficient to ensure access
without the additional fixed buffer zone.'38 But the Court
pointed to the record where the petitioners' persistence in past
activities, such as aggressively following individuals up to the
entrance, and loitering in the parking lot to block vehicles,
properly led the district court to assume that such activities
132. See id- at 868-69.
133. See id.
134. See id. (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 769-70
(1992)).
135. Id. at 868 n.11 (citing Pro-Choice Network v. Project Reserve, 799 F. Supp.
1417, 1434 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
136. See i at 869.
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would continue.1 7 Thus, "a prophylactic measure was even
more appropriate."" s
Petitioners also argued that the district court should have
first attempted a "non-speech-restrictive" injunction, as the trial
court imposed in Madsen, before establishing a "speech-restric-
tive" injunction.'39 The Court, however, explained that the
failure of an injunction to achieve its objective "may be taken
into consideration7' in assessing the constitutionality of the
subsequent injunction.'4 ' Thus, the "speech-restrictive" provi-
sion in the original TRO did not preclude the validity of the
following injunction.42
Finally, the Court rejected petitioners' arguments contending
that there was "no extraordinary record of pervasive lawless-
ness"' to justify the buffer zones, and that the term "demon-
strating" was too ambiguous.' Pointing to the record, the
Court found that the demonstrators' conduct was indeed ex-
traordinary enough to justify the district court's holding.'45 Al-
so, the Court explained, the injunction, when read in its en-
tirety, would clearly indicate to "people 'of ordinary intelli-
gence ... a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited.'
137. See id. Indeed, "[p]ost-injury remedies are frequently an ineffective and inade-
quate measure of protection, especially in light of the physical harm that can result
to clinic patients from protestors' tactics." The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading
Cases: Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 339, 345 (1997) (referring to H.R. REP.
No. 103-306, at 707 (1994) and Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural
Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abor-
tion Protests--Section II, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1163, 1192-95 (1996)).
138. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 869.
139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id. (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 770).
142. See id.
143. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners 45).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 869-70 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 110
(1972)).
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4. Cease-and-Desist Provision
The Court also upheld the cease-and-desist provisions (that
forced sidewalk counselors inside the buffer zones to retreat
fifteen feet from the person being counseled once the person
indicated a desire not be counseled), but on different grounds
from the district court's reasoning.147 The Court criticized the
district court's captive audience justification for including the
provision-to protect the right of the people approaching and
entering the facilities to be left alone. It further stated that
such a principle was not legally sound given Madsen's insis-
tence on tolerating such speech in order to accommodate free-
doms protected by the First Amendment.' The Court never-
theless upheld the provision stating that the entire exception
for sidewalk counselors was the district court's justiciable effort
to enhance petitioners' free speech rights.' The Court reject-
ed the petitioners' contention that the cease-and-desist provision
was content-based-restricting counselors' speech based on the
individual's disagreement with the speech conveyed-because
the restriction was directed only to demonstrators who had
done the prohibited acts. 50 Moreover, the Court explained,
counselors remained able to communicate outside the fifteen-
foot zone and the restriction was only the result of their own
previous harassment and intimidation activities. 5'
C. Justice Scalia, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, wrote
separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part with the
majority opinion. Justice Scalia was primarily concerned with
the Court's upholding of the injunction upon justifications other
147. See id. at 870.
148. See id. The Court noted that current case law does not recognize any sweep-
ing right to be left alone because "in public debate our own citizens must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." Id (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
149. See id.
150. See id at 869.
151. See id.
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152than those prompting its issuance, as discussed in Section
III.B.4., supra. Focusing on the district court's illegitimate basis
for the cease-and-desist order-that people have a general right
to be left alone-Justice Scalia insisted that it was illogical to
reverse this justification while simultaneously sustaining the
injunction as burdening no more speech than necessary."
Justice Scalia claimed that this maneuver by the Court was
"contrary to the settled practice governing appellate review of
injunctions, and indeed of all actions committed by law to the
initial factfinding, predictive and policy judgment of an entity
other than the appellate court."'
More specifically, Justice Scalia explained that when the
district court justified both the fixed buffer provision and the
cease-and-desist order on grounds that an individual has a
right to be left alone, the court based that justification on re-
peated evidence that intimidation of women was the real factu-
al problem, not obstructed access."' Thus, in upholding the
fixed buffer zone because of repeated instances of obstructing
access, Justice Scalia contended, the Supreme Court supplanted
not only a new legal justification for the zone, but a factual one
as well." Justice Scalia pointed to pieces of the Supreme
Court's opinion which he termed "carefully selected words"157
to disguise the factual manipulation, such as, "[t]he District
Court was entitled to conclude on this record that the only
feasible way to shield individuals within the fixed buffer zone
from unprotected conduct.., would have been to keep the
entire area clear of defendant protestors.""S Also "[biased on
the [defendants'] conduct, the District Court was entitled to con-
clude ... that the only way to ensure access was to move all
protestors away from the doorways.""' Thus, Justice Scalia
asserted that the Supreme Court conjured up conclusions that
152. See id. at 871.
153. See id. at 871 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. See i at 871-72.
156. See id. at 872.
157. Id.
158. Id. (emphasis in original).
159. Id. (emphasis in original).
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the trial court could have reached based on factual issues, but
did not, and then upheld the decision on those grounds."6
Related to this point, Justice Scalia took issue with the
Court's characterization of the sidewalk counselors inside the
buffer zone as "an effort to bend over backwards to
'accommodate' defendants' speech rights."'6  Criticizing the
Court's depiction of the district court's allowance of sidewalk
counselors as a charitable benefaction by the Court, Justice
Scalia countered that the situation actually necessitated allow-
ing selected representatives in the zone. 62 Berating the Court,
Justice Scalia wrote, "[t]he Court's effort to recharacterize this
responsibility of special care imposed by the First Amendment
as some sort of judicial gratuity is perhaps the most alarming
concept .... .163
Finally, Justice Scalia chastised the Court for relying on the
public safety interest to uphold the injunction even though
public safety was not listed anywhere on the original com-
plaint.' Justice Scalia claimed that this departed from the
traditional separation of powers of the Executive and Judicial
Branches, as it was inappropriate for the district court to "de-
cree measures that would eliminate obstruction of traffic, in a
lawsuit which ha[d] established nothing more than
trespass.""6 Thus, Justice Scalia asserted, the Court assumed
the authority to "decree what may be necessary to protect-not
the plaintiff, but the public interest!""
D. Justice Breyer, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Justice Breyer criticized the Court for even recognizing a
floating buffer concept from the record and, by using transcripts
from the lower courts, argued there was no intention in the
160. See id.
161. Id. at 873.
162. See iU at 873. "Thus, if the situation confronting the District Court permitted
'accommodation' of petitioners' free speech rights, it demanded it." Id. (emphasis in
original).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 871.
165. Id. at 875.
166. Id. at 874 (emphasis in original).
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original injunction to create such a mechanism. 67 He showed
that the floating buffer concept was not necessarily created by
the original TRO's words "trespassing on, sitting in, blocking,
impeding or obstructing access to, ingress into or egress from
any facility at which abortions are performed... including
demonstrating within [fifteen] feet of any person seeking access
to or leaving such facilities.""6 Pointing to the district court
transcript, Justice Breyer showed that the lower court actually
clarified orally that the TRO did not imply a floating con-
cept.1" However, the identical language (with the added
words "or vehicle") then found its way into the preliminary
injunction, along with some rearranging and relettering of
paragraphs.Y Thus, Justice Breyer surmised, there was no
justification to believe that the district court meant to give the
key language a significantly different meaning or a new pur-
pose other than its original purpose."
Justice Breyer reinforced his point by referring to the oral
argument before the court of appeals panel where even the
petitioners' counsel confirmed there was no intention to create a
floating buffer zone.' Later, however, at the en banc hearing,
the court of appeals recognized that the ambiguity of the lan-
guage might indeed create such a concept and deferred to the
district court to resolve the matter." Thus, Justice Breyer
asserted, since the question still remained, the Supreme Court
should have deferred to the district court to resolve any linguis-
tic ambiguity, just as the court of appeals did.' He concluded
167. See id at 875-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 876 (citing Appendix) (emphasis in original).
169. See id. Here the Court responded to Reverend Schenck's question as to
whether this portion of the TRO would create a floating bubble. The Court responded,
"We're talking fifteen feet from [e.g., a doorway] ... to go right out to where ever
you're going ... [Mly gosh, you would never be able ... to deal with that if it was
a moving length." Id (quoting excerpts from the Appendix to Reply Brief for Petition-
er A-2 to A-3).
170. See id. at 875.
171. See id- at 876.
172. See id. at 877. Here, counsel for petitioners responded to the appeals court
question as to whether an individual can "leave" and still be subject to the injunc-
tion. The attorney responded, "Maybe I just didn't see the full implications of the
injunction, but I never considered that beyond the 15-foot bubble zone there would be
this same restriction. Even rm not arguing that the injunction goes that far." Id.
173. See id
174. See id.
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his opinion by stating, "[a]nd I see no special need here for the
Court to make an apparently general statement about the law
of 'floating bubbles,' which later developments may show to
have been unnecessary or unwise."
175
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SCHENCK
The Court's conspicuous manipulation of the district court's
reasoning in order to justify the holdings, and its insistence on
identifying a floating buffer zone in order to strike it down,
indicate the Court's determined effort to clarify which injunc-
tion elements will satisfy the Madsen "burdens" test. The Court
seemed to say that if justified by certain government interests
and supported by the record, appropriately designed fixed buffer
zones are constitutional, whereas floating buffer zones are
not. 6 Although the Court accomplished its objective through
a curious maneuver of reasoning, it did so in a legally appropri-
ate fashion and, as a result, established a workable framework
for courts to assess the constitutionality of similar injunctions.
The next subsections analyze the Court's reasoning, discuss the
implications of the fixed and floating buffer zones, and sum-
marize a survey of lower court holdings subsequent to the
Schenck decision.
A. Appropriateness of Substituting the District Court's
Reasoning
The Court noticeably supplanted the district court's reasoning
with more appropriate bases for upholding the lower court's
findings, which deserves some further attention. One instance
was the Court's recognition of significant government interests
different from those identified by the district court and the
original complaint.177 The Court claimed that it is appropriate
175. Id. at 878.
176. The Court avoided stating this conclusively, but nevertheless implied that
broad prohibitions that travel with an individual must be struck down. The Court
stated, "We need not decide whether the governmental interests involved would ever
justify some sort of zone of separation between individuals ... measured by the
distance between the two. We hold here that because this broad prohibition on speech
foats,' it cannot be sustained on this record." Id. at 867.
177. See id at 865-66.
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for a court to examine not only the private claims asserted in
the complaint, but also the government interests protected by
the injunction.'78 The other circumstance was the Court's up-
holding of the cease-and-desist provision on contrary grounds to
the lower court's justification. The Court rejected the district
court's justification that a person has the right to be left alone,
but nevertheless upheld the cease-and-desist provision, noting
that "the entire exception for sidewalk counselors was an effort
to enhance petitioners' [free] speech rights . . . ."'
Both the majority and Justice Scalia relied on SEC v.
Chenery Corp."s' in defending their positions, a case which
lends more support to the majority. In Chenery, the Court rec-
ognized that if an administrative agency bases a determination
upon a misconception of the law, then the order may not stand.
The decision of a trial court, however, must be affirmed if the
result is correct, even if the court relied upon a wrong rea-
son. 8 ' In other words, Chenery distinguishes between the
more narrow power of judicial review of agency administrative
decisions and the power of appellate review within the federal
court system. In addressing the broader scope of appellate re-
view of a court decision, the Chenery Court explained:
It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower court to
reinstate a decision which it had already made but which
the appellate court concluded should properly be based on
another ground within the power of the appellate court to
formulate. But it is also familiar appellate procedure that
where the correctness of the lower court's decision depends
upon a determination of fact which only a jury could make
but which has not been made, the appellate court cannot
take the place of the jury.'82
It would appear, therefore, that the Schenck majority appropri-
ately substituted different reasoning in upholding the district
178. See id. at 866.
179. Id. at 870.
180. 318 U.S. 80 (1943). The majority also relied on Rutan v. Republican Party,
497 U.S. 62, 76 (1990), and Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982), but Chenery
elaborates most directly regarding the powers of appellate review.
181. See Chenery, 318 U.S. at 88, 94.
182. Id. at 88.
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court's decision-only if the factors underlying the lower court's
decision could have been made without a jury determination.
Here is where Justice Scalia's dissent specifically took issue
with the Court's actions. As described in Section III.B., supra,
Justice Scalia contended that in upholding the fixed buffer
zones, the Court found that obstructed access to clinics served
as the real justification, not intimidation of women." A closer
look at the wording of the district court, however, indicates that
the Supreme Court did not take literary license with the factu-
al record, as Justice Scalia insisted. In its findings of fact, the
district court found that defendants engaged in physically block-
ading entrance to and exit from the abortion clinics, which in-
cluded sitting or lying on the clinic property, locking arms to
prevent access, and effectively halting complete operation of the
clinic." 4 Although the physical blockades apparently stopped
after the issuance of the TRO,'" constructive blockading con-
tinued in full force including demonstrating and picketing
around the clinics, harassing individuals around the clinic en-
trances, and congregating in or near driveway entrances to
impede or obstruct access to the facilities." The activities
even caused some individuals attempting to enter the driveway
or doorway to leave the area because of confusion or intimida-
tion. 8' Although the district court erroneously concentrated on
"a person's right to be left alone,""s the district court could
have relied easily on the constructive blockading activities ob-
viously existent in the record to justify the fifteen-foot fixed
buffer zone around the entrances without a jury determination
of those same facts."9
183. See Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 871-72 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
184. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1424 (W.D.N.Y.
1992).
185. See id. at 1424 n.5.
186. See id at 1424.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 1435.
189. In addition to establishing rules regarding content-neutral injunctions, Schenck
also appears to be confirming the power of appellate courts to substitute reasoning of
lower court decisions. One author quotes Schenck directly regarding this principle: "It
is a fundamental principle of appellate jurisprudence that an appeals court has both
the power and the duty to affirm on any grounds that are obviously suggested by the
record, even when no party has raised that alternative basis for afirmance." James
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The Schenck Court's upholding of the cease-and-desist order
also passes the Chenery test. Here, more appropriate legal rea-
soning was substituted in a situation where the factual record
was not even an issue. As discussed in Section Ill.B. supra,
Justice Scalia harshly criticized the Court for postulating rea-
sons that the district court might have used and took issue
with the Court's characterization of the sidewalk counselor
exemption as a "judicial gratuity,""9 arguing that the circum-
stances necessitated the provision since courts have an affirma-
tive duty to cultivate speech rights.' The Schenck Court's
characterization of the sidewalk counseling provision as "an
effort to bend over backwards " " may be an exaggeration, but
the district court nevertheless exceeded necessity. Indeed, the
Madsen Court demonstrated that a similar fact situation did
not require a sidewalk counseling provision; a thirty-six-foot
buffer zone was upheld in Madsen with no exceptions for side-
walk counselors.. Therefore, it would seem there was no obli-
gation for the district court in Schenck to include such an ex-
emption. In addressing the sidewalk provision, the only reason
the district court articulated was "an attempt to accommodate
fully defendants' First Amendment rights ... ."' An assump-
tion by the Schenck Court that the lower court meant "accom-
modate fully" as a gratuitous gesture was reasonable, especially
in light of the minimal distance of the fixed buffer zone and the
allowance of alternative communications, such as picketing and
leafleting near the zone. Thus, in keeping with Chenery, the
Schenck Court justifiably rejected the lower court's reliance on
the captive audience doctrine while respecting the district
Joseph Duane, The Trouble with United States v. Tellier. The Dangers of Hunting for
Bootstrappers and Other Mythical Monsters, 24 Am. J. CRIM. L. 215, 257 (1997) (cit-
ing Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 870 n.12, as well as several other lower federal court
cases that upheld the principle of appellate review, even when determination of jury
facts could be an issue, such as United States v. Gordon, 78 F.3d 781, 786 (2d Cir.
1996), Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 71 F.3d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1995),
United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1986), and Taylor v. Kinsella, 742
F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1984)).
190. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 873.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 869 n.11.
193. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1994).
194. Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1434 (W.D.N.Y.
1992).
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court's intent to cancel the sidewalk counseling privilege if
abused or rejected by the audience.
B. The Buffer Zones-Message to the Courts
Assuming that the Court's reasoning was sound, the Court's
message from Schenck and Madsen appears clear: a record
showing continuous harassment, intimidation, and constructive
blockading that prevent or impede access to clinics will support
a reasonably drawn fixed buffer zone around the entranceways
in order to ensure access.'95 This should not only provide wel-
come guidance to the courts, but assist in decreasing violence
around abortion clinics as well."9 Indeed, recent studies have
found that "one-third of clinics with buffer zones, a [ten] to
[thirty]-foot protected area around clinics, had greater decreases
in violence than those without buffer-zone protection."9 '
1. Fixed Buffer Zones-Application by Lower Courts
Only a few courts to date have employed the holding of
Schenck concerning fixed buffer zones. In March of 1997, a
Massachusetts state court correctly followed Schenk in Planned
Parenthood League v. Bell,' where a woman appealed a pre-
liminary injunction prohibiting her from entering within fifty
feet of an abortion clinic.' The woman had previously worn
garments which falsely represented her as a clinic escort, shout-
ed loudly around the clinic, and blocked, harassed, and intimi-
dated patients who attempted to enter the clinic." ° The court
195. See generally Schenck, 117 S. Ct. 855.
196. Note that since Schenck's guidance steps rely excessively on facts, there may
remain a need to provide better direction to lower courts regarding how to interpret
the facts. This area of ambiguity may pose a "risk that courts will grant either too
much or too little protection to women seeking reproductive health services." The
Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 111 HARV., L. REV.
197, 347 (1997).
197. See Cannon, supra note 14. Indeed, since previous law enforcement tactics
have proven ineffective, the Court "correctly concluded that fixed buffer zones were
necessary to provide adequate protection to clinic patients and staff.7 The Supreme
Court, 1996 Term, supra note 199, at 346.
198. 677 N.E.2d 204 (Mass. 1997).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 206-07.
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correctly considered such factors as violations of previous court
orders, continuous obstructive activity, and the practicality of
the measured distance in upholding a fifty-foot fixed buffer zone
around the clinic.'
Likewise, in Lucero v. Trosch,'2 an Eleventh Circuit case,
where defendants deliberately delayed patients and vehicles as
they attempted to access the clinic,"° the Madsen burdens
test was correctly applied to two types of fixed buffer zones.
The governmental interests identified were a woman's freedom
to seek abortion counseling and services, public safety, free flow
of traffic, and the property rights of citizens.2°4 The court
found that a twenty-five-foot buffer zone around the clinic bur-
dened no more speech than necessary, since the defendants
could still express their message outside of the zone, and thus
deferred to the lower court's judgment that the distance was
reasonable.3 5
But a provision enjoining protestors from picketing, demon-
strating, or using sound equipment within 200 feet of staff
residences was found in violation of the First Amendment.'
The court compared the buffer zone to a similar 300-foot buffer
zone in Madsen that was struck down as overbroad.07 The
court explained that "the 200-foot no approach residential buffer
zone does not simply proscribe activities directly in front of the
staff residences, but rather operates as a generalized restriction
on protesting and thus is unconstitutional."' Time will tell if
other courts will appropriately assess fixed buffer zones, but
Schenck's clear holding should ensure success.
2. Floating Buffer Zones-Recognition of New Concept
The Court continued its outlay of guidance steps in its treat-
ment of the floating buffer zones. Given that the Schenck dis-
201. See id. at 211-12.
202. 121 F.3d 591 (1997).
203. See id. at 594-95.
204. See id. at 605.
205. See id. at 606.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Id.
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trict court never directly addressed floating buffer zones in its
opinion, the Court could have referred the matter to the district
court to clarify the ambiguity.Y But since the Court chose
instead to identify the floating buffer zone and further strike it
down, it is questioned whether the majority incorrectly inter-
preted the meaning of a floating buffer zone as it was meant by
the lower court, as Justice Breyer insisted in his dissent."10
Contending that the court of appeals took creative license with
the preliminary injunction's language to engender two types of
buffer zones, floating and fixed, Justice Breyer drew largely
upon transcripts from the district court level, discussed in Sec-
tion HI.D., supra, to show there was no intention to devise a
traveling buffer zone, and that even the petitioners at the court
of appeals level seemed unaware of such a concept."
However, one of the preliminary injunction's key revisions to
the TRO was a prohibition of demonstrating within fifteen feet
of clinic entrances or driveways, in addition to people and vehi-
cles, probably indicating the district court's intent to impose
both types of protective zones.2" Also, contempt violations at
the district court level were imposed upon defendants who came
within fifteen feet of an individual, even though they were more
than fifteen feet from the clinic entrance."13 Also, as the Court
noted in its opinion, "no judge of the en banc court of appeals
expressed doubt that the injunction included floating buffer
zones ... and. . . none of the parties before us has suggested
that the injunction does not provide for such zones."14 Thus,
the Court reasonably acknowledged a floating buffer zone from
the record.
Since the Court took pains to justify its recognition of the
floating buffer zone-before striking it down-the Court plainly
wanted to show that such concepts are unconstitutional in simi-
lar situations. Although it refrained from holding floating buffer
209. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855, 877 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
210. See id. at 875-77.
211. See id. at 876.
212. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1440 (W.D.N.Y.
1992); see also Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 867 n.10.
213. See Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 867 n.10.
214. Id
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zones as presumptively unconstitutional, the Court did note,
"[we need not decide whether the governmental interests in-
volved would ever justify some sort of zone of separation be-
tween individuals entering the clinics and protestors, measured
by the distance between the two. We hold here that because
this broad prohibition on speech 'floats,' it cannot be sustained
on the record."215 Aside from a brief reference to the impracti-
cality of such a concept, the Court justified its holding with
traditional concepts of preserving the public sidewalks for clas-
sic forms of free speech.216 Even a cursory reading of Schenck
should dissuade any future court from upholding a floating
buffer zone.217
3. Floating Buffer Zones-Application by Lower Courts
The application of Schenck to floating buffer zones has, how-
ever, proved to be a problem with the lower courts. Already, at
least one court has perhaps incorrectly applied Schenck's hold-
ing. In United States v. Scott,218 the United States filed suit
against a single protestor under FACE, and a federal district
court in Connecticut upheld an injunction which created a "zone
of separation between individuals entering the clinics and [dem-
onstrators], measured by the distance between the two."2 9
The lower court attempted to distinguish this zone from the
floating buffer concept by pointing to the Schenck Court's state-
ment that it, "did need not decide 'whether the governmental
interests involved would ever justify some sort of zone of sepa-
ration between individuals entering the clinics and protestors,
measured by the distance between the two. . . ."22 But the
court in Scott seemed to misunderstand the Schenck holding
because the very definition of a floating buffer zone in Schenck
215. Id. at 867.
216. See id.
217. See Kathryn D. Piele, Sabelko v. City of Phoenix: Ninth Circuit Refuses to
Burst "Bubble" Protecting Women Entering Health Care Facilities, 75 OR. L REV.
1297, 1330 (1996). The author notes that Schenck's holding pertaining to floating
buffer zones in injunctions may also extend to ordinances because "the Court seemed
to have a particular distaste for floating buffer zones." Id.
218. 958 F. Supp. 761 (1997), affd, 975 F. Supp. 428 (1997).
219. Id. at 781.
220. Id. (quoting Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 867).
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is indeed the distance between "any person or vehicle seeking
access to or leaving such facilities."22
In a Ruling on Defendant Scott's Motion for Reconsidera-
tion,' the court upheld the floating buffer zone, clarifying
several points. First, the court pointed to Schenck's statement,
"We need not decide whether the governmental interests in-
volved would ever justify some sort of zone of separation be-
tween individuals... ,' as an opening for when govern-
mental interests would be justified. As such, the court claimed
that the separation was "necessary and justified based on
Scott's repeated and consistent violations of FACE by force,
threat of force, and physical obstruction, and his frequent nose-
to-nose confrontations with patients and escorts."' Second,
the court pointed out that the floating buffer zone was only five
feet, and not fifteen as proposed in Schenck.' Third, the re-
striction enjoined only one person, not a group of demonstra-
tors.' Finally, the floating buffer zone was limited to the
streets and parking lot.' The court concluded that overall,
where the Schenck Court found that the problem established by
the record could be solved by a fixed buffer zone, the record in
Scott could not.' Whether the Schenck Court intended for
"special circumstances" to allow for floating buffer zones is
questionable, although an injunction against one person cer-
tainly departs from the factual record before Schenck. This
decision may be further modified if appealed.
Another area of unresolved concern is whether Schenck's
strong message pertaining to floating buffer zones in injunctions
should also pertain to general ordinances.' Although the Su-
221. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 862.
222. United States v. Scott, 975 F. Supp. 428 (1997).
223. Id. at 431 (quoting Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 867).
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id. 'Thus, the court has created a small and bounded zone, not the type
of floating zone invalidated by Schenck." Id. at 431-32. Also, the court further differ-
entiated Scott from Schenck by explaining that Scott was predicated upon a violation
of FACE, a statute which states that activities protected by the First Amendment do
not violate FACE. "Thus, by ruling that Scott violated FACE on numerous occasions,
the court already addressed many of the First Amendment concerns typically raised
in response to a motion [filed for an injunction]." Id. at 432 n.2.
228. See id. at 432.
229. "While some courts ... have correctly refused to apply Madsen to ordinances,
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preme Court seemed to disfavor the nature of floating buffer
zones in Schenck in general, Madsen determined that less scru-
tiny is applied to ordinances as opposed to injunctions and are
upheld if they are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest, and... [left] open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication of the information.""0 Thus, it is not
clear if a floating buffer zone could survive in an ordinance.
This unresolved issue arose in Hill v. City of Lakewood, 1 a
Colorado state court of appeals case in which a statute required
a protestor to remain at least eight feet from any person who
was within 100 feet of an abortion clinic, unless the other per-
son consented. 2 The legislature had adopted the statute out
of concern for public safety issues presented by problems caused
by demonstrators outside of abortion clinics, and especially to
assist persons with disabilities to access the clinic.' The
court of appeals had originally found that the statute, which
was content-neutral, was supported by valid government inter-
ests and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' The Su-
preme Court, however, granted certiorari and remanded the
case in light of Schenck. 5 The state court of appeals affirmed
its original decision, emphasizing that lesser scrutiny applied to
the floating buffer zone since it was a generally applicable ordi-
nance instead of an injunction. 6 The court also justified the
zone because it extended only eight feet, instead of fifteen feet
as in Schenck, and extended even less than eight feet if permit-
ted by the individual counseled. 7 Furthermore, the court not-
ed that there were ample alternative channels for communica-
tion available within 100 feet of the entrance, such as display-
ing placards and other visual items.' Finally, the court re-
other courts have erroneously applied Madsen's injunction test to ordinances, thus
obscuring the previously clear test for ordinances. The Supreme Court may clarify
this issue in Schenck . . . ." Ellis & Wu, supra note 50, at 563-64.
230. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (cit-
ing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)).
231. 949 P.2d 107 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
232. See id. at 107.
233. See id. at 108.
234. See Hill v. Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
235. See Hill v. Colorado, 117 S. Ct. 1077 (1997).
236. See Hill, 949 P.2d at 109-110.
237. See id. at 110.
238. See id.
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jected the argument that it would be difficult for a demonstra-
tor to ascertain an eight-foot distance, stating that the statute
only prohibited a person who "knowingly" approached an in-
dividual within that distance. 9
Despite the state court of appeals' superficially correct reli-
ance on Madsen, this case will likely be reversed. Although the
court is correct that the Madsen "burdens" test does not apply
to generally applicable ordinances, the Supreme Court in
Schenck emphasized that any floating buffer zone establishes a
broad prohibition on speech that affects traditional types of
speech, such as leafleting and commenting, as well as tradition-
al areas of speech, such as public sidewalks.' Also, the ordi-
nance may not be narrowly tailored if only select individuals
caused the problem, and the ordinance, with more general ap-
plication, affects everyone within its scope. Finally, whether
someone "knowingly" approaches another within eight feet
would be considerably difficult to determine.
The federal courts, on the other hand, seem to heed
Schenck's message concerning floating buffer zones by discour-
aging them even in ordinances. In Sabelko v. City of Phoe-
nix,"1 for example, anti-abortion sidewalk counselors brought
an action challenging an ordinance that made it unlawful for a
person to fail to withdraw, upon a clearly communicated re-
quest to do so, to a distance of at least eight feet away from
any person who so requested.' Like Hill v. City of
Lakewood,' this case was granted certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court, and remanded for consideration in light
of Schenck.' But in applying even the Madsen intermediate
test for ordinances, this court found the statute unconstitutional
because it contained the same basic defects as Schenck. First,
the court found that the floating buffer zone established a
broad prohibition of speech with which it was difficult to com-
ply without risking a violation of the ordinance. 5 Also, an
239. See Ud
240. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855, 867 (1997).
241. 120 F.3d 161 (1997).
242. See id
243. 949 P.2d 107 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
244. 117 S. Ct. 1077 (1997).
245. See Sabelko, 120 F.Sd at 165.
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individual within the access area to a clinic could invoke the
eight-foot floating buffer zone, effectively preventing the
handbilling and normal conversation.' Furthermore, the
problem of determining distance and uncertainty concerning
compliance established a substantial risk that more speech
would be eliminated than the ordinance itself prohibits."
Thus, the court reasoned, it lacked the narrow tailoring nec-
essary to survive even the intermediate scrutiny applicable to
ordinances.'
V. CONCLUSION
Given the delicate balancing courts perform when restricting
the activities of anti-abortion demonstrators, the Schenck deci-
sion provides welcome guidance for developing and reviewing
injunctions within the Madsen "burdens" test. Although the
Court's reasoning superimposes the district court's justification
for issuing the injunction, the Court's analytical framework was
legally appropriate and provides a practical directive. Although
it appears there remains some ambiguity regarding whether
floating buffer zones can survive in ordinances, Schenck's strong
message should discourage these mechanisms. Consequently,
future court assessments of content neutral injunctions and
ordinances that correctly follow Schenck and Madsen should
uphold fixed buffer zones if designed in a reasonable manner
and necessitated by the record, and invalidate floating buffer
zones.
Amy E. Miller
246. See id,
247. See id.
248. See id.
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